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families and individuals who are not working have poor incentives to find a job – because 
for many, “it does not pay to work.” Unemployment benefits and cash transfers, coupled 
with high tax wedge, create high work disincentives. To address this issue, Slovenia should 
consider introducing into-work benefits, in-work benefits, or both. Presently such policies 
are virtually non-existent. In the light of international successful experiences with such 
policies and given the strong work disincentive created by unemployment, inactivity and 
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from non-employment to employment and stay in employment. 
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INTRODUCTION
Unemployment benefits and cash trans-
fers may create work disincentives, espe-
cially when coupled with large taxation 
rates of personal income. Particularly for 
families with several dependents, such cir-
cumstances can create an “unemployment 
trap” or an “inactivity trap” – disincentives 
due to non-employment benefits being rel-
atively high compared with expected in-
comes when working, as well as the “low-
wage trap” – disincentives due to additional 
taxes and of cash benefit reductions taking 
away most of additional earnings from in-
creased hours worked. An important fac-
tor is also a tax burden on labor. There is 
compelling empirical evidence that high 
taxes on labor, especially in combination 
with unemployment benefits, significantly 
increase unemployment (OECD, 2004; for 
an overview of studies on the effects of tax 
wedge see also Dolenc and Laporšek, 2010). 
As taxes and benefits have negative ef-
fects on individual’s work decision, it has 
become important to regularly assess finan-
cial incentives to work, among which the 
most commonly used ones are the marginal 
effective tax rates – i.e., the unemployment 
trap, the inactivity trap and the low wage or 
poverty trap. Their magnitude (i.e., percent-
age of additional earnings being lost due to 
increasing taxes and decreasing benefits) 
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may affect structural unemployment, de-
cision to stay in employment and working 
hours, especially for low-productivity and 
low-paid workers. Identifying financial in-
centives to work is therefore an important 
guide for shaping making-work-pay poli-
cies and reforms of tax and welfare systems 
(Carone et al., 2004).
To improve low-pay earners’ incentives 
to participate in the labor market and to re-
duce poverty of marginal groups of workers 
and their dependents, several OECD/EU 
countries have introduced policies aimed at 
making work pay. These policies have two 
main objectives: (i) increasing employment 
by creating additional financial rewards for 
remaining in employment or for accepting 
(a low-paid) job, and (ii) enhancing the in-
comes of disadvantaged groups of workers 
and their families (Immervoll and Pearson, 
2009). Countries may also have specific 
objectives adapted to their economic and 
institutional circumstances – for example, 
in some of the EU countries with gener-
ous social transfers (for example, Sweden, 
Finland, France, Belgium and Germany), 
making-work-pay policies have been in-
troduced to ensure that there is a financial 
difference between welfare and paid work 
(Bargain, 2008). 
Making-work-pay policies are typically 
targeted at people who face the highest risk 
of unemployment and poverty in work. As 
such, they are especially attuned to situa-
tions when people are receiving only out-of-
work incomes, have low earnings capacity, 
or work in low paid jobs (Bargain et al., 
2010). Yet the decision to take up a job is 
not influenced only by financial, but also by 
non-financial factors, such as availability of 
childcare, balance between work and family 
life, working conditions, and training and 
rehabilitation. Although this paper focuses 
only on financial incentives, non-financial 
factors must also be considered when de-
signing policies aimed at enhancing labor 
market participation, especially of women, 
lone parents and older workers (EMCO, 
2003).
The paper firstly describes main features 
of making-work-pay policies, supported by 
examples of the EU and the OECD coun-
tries. In empirical part it aims to analyze 
work incentives indicators in Slovenia and 
to put Slovenia in the international per-
spective. The paper also discusses whether 
Slovenia should, following international 
experience, introduce making-work-pay 
policies. While existing programs cannot 
simply be transplanted to other countries, 
much can be learned from their experience. 
The organization of the paper is as fol-
lows. We first provide an overview of inter-
national experience with making-work-pay 
policies (Section 2). We continue with the 
analysis of work incentives indicators in 
Slovenia and the EU countries (Sections 3 
and 4). The final section summarizes main 
findings and discusses the sense of introduc-
ing into-work benefits, in-work benefits, or 
both in Slovenia.
OVERVIEW OF MAKING-
WORK-PAY POLICIES IN THE 
OECD/EU COUNTRIES
Making-work-pay policies take two 
forms: (i) into-work benefits and (ii) perma-
nent in-work benefits, which can be further 
grouped into tax credits and reductions of 
personal income taxes and/or of employee 
social security contributions.1 An over-
view of implementation of making-work-
pay policies across OECD/EU countries 
shows that into-work benefits can be found 
1 These policy measures address the labor supply side, as they incentivize individuals by increasing their work 
incomes. Another strand of making-work-pay policies, which are not explicitly addressed in this paper, focuses 
on labor demand and aims at reducing labor costs of hiring (low-skilled) workers via employer-based approaches.
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in nine OECD/EU countries,2 whereas in-
work benefits have been implemented in 
twelve OECD/EU countries.3 Into-work 
and in-work benefit schemes differ in sev-
eral aspects, but they all have in common 
that eligibility is contingent on paid em-
ployment. Below we describe key features 
of both schemes.
Into-work benefits typically provide 
support for a few months after the start of 
new employment or take the form of one-off 
payment. Due to this, they have a limited 
effect on reducing in-work poverty (Immer-
voll and Pearson, 2009). However, the time 
limitation may strengthen incentives, as it 
may encourage recipients to progress more 
rapidly in their jobs to achieve self-suffi-
ciency (OECD, 2003). In most countries 
into-work benefits depend on the recipi-
ent’s prior status, rather than just being in-
come-tested. They are mostly targeted to 
unemployed, particularly long-term unem-
ployed, workers receiving unemployment 
benefits or social assistance (Canada, Ger-
many, Ireland, Japan, Korea and Romania) 
and can therefore be received by a smaller 
number of people. Eligibility for these ben-
efits may be contingent on additional char-
acteristics of the recipient.4 The generosity 
of these benefits varies across countries – 
from 180 EUR (253 CAD) paid as a lump 
sum once a year in Canada to 950 EUR per 
month for up to a year in Austria. In Japan, 
Korea and Romania the amount of benefit is 
linked to the amount of unpaid “remaining 
unemployment benefit” at the start of a job 
(OECD, 2018a). 
In-work benefits are targeted to low-in-
come individuals or families with at least 
one family member employed. As the 
amount of benefits is in most cases linked 
to income from work and/or hours worked, 
this group of benefits has a more pro-
nounced effect on income distribution and 
in-work poverty and, in addition, stimulates 
workers to remain in employment (Immer-
voll and Pearson, 2009). Most in-work ben-
efits are not time limited.5
Most OECD/EU countries apply in-
work benefits in a form of tax credits. Tax 
credits are mostly targeted to individuals 
or families with children, with the aim of 
topping-up low wages (for example, the 
Working Income Tax Benefit in Canada, the 
Earned Income Tax Credit in Korea, Swe-
den and the United States, and the Work-
ing Tax Credit, formerly Working Families 
Tax Credit, in the United Kingdom). The 
eligibility and the amount of tax credit is 
determined based on income from work, 
working hours, and the number of children, 
often by a combination of the three crite-
ria. Reflecting the fact that they represent a 
tool for in-work benefits and child poverty 
reduction, in several countries in-work ben-
efits are directed only to working families 
with children (for example, Ireland, South 
Korea, New Zealand; see Immervoll and 
2 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Romania and Slovakia. A detailed de-
scription of into-work benefits in these countries is available at OECD (2018a).
3 Canada, Chile, France, Ireland, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United King-
dom, the United States. Belgium and Finland apply in-work benefits in a form of reduction in personal income 
tax and/or employee social security contributions. A detailed description of permanent in-work benefits in these 
countries is available at OECD (2018a).
4 For example, in Austria, into-work benefits are available to workers who are unemployed for six months 
or more and are older than 45 years; or returning to work from parental leave; or being of low work capacity. 
In Slovakia into-work benefits are provided to long-term unemployed who earn less than double the minimum 
wage (see Gerbery, 2015), whereas in Belgium to long-term unemployed lone parents (OECD, 2018a).
5  An exception to this is Ireland, where the in-work benefit lasts for one year, however it is renewed con-
ditional that the person remains in employment (OECD, 2018a).
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Pearson, 2009; Immervoll, 2016).6 In con-
trast, in Finland, France and Sweden tax 
credits are calculated based only on an 
individual’s earnings, implying that their 
main aim is the promotion of work-incen-
tive and not so much a type of redistribu-
tion (OECD, 2003, 2005). Compared to 
family-based schemes, individual-based 
in-work benefits are likely to have greater 
incentive effects for all earners, because 
such schemes have smaller discouraging 
effects on second earners in couples (Bar-
gain, 2008). However, this might come at 
the expense of higher costs and poorer tar-
geting, as low earners in non-poor house-
holds may also become eligible (Matsagan-
is and Figari, 2016). The generosity of tax 
credits varies significantly across countries. 
As regards the compensation design, most 
countries have a phase-in region, followed 
by a plateau and a phase-out region (van der 
Linden, 2016). The phase-in and phase-out 
rules, beside benefit level, define the level 
of benefit generosity. The in-work benefits 
are most generous in the United Kingdom, 
whereas the United States record one of the 
lowest in-work benefit generosities.7 
Tax credits schemes are perceived as 
costly and administratively demanding 
schemes. Estimations show that the budget-
ary costs for tax credit system present up to 
2 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom 
and 1.3 percent of GDP in Australia, while 
in the United States they amount to about 
0.6 percent (OECD, 2014). Besides, they 
are often criticized for being bureaucratic 
and non-adaptive to changes in family or 
individual situations, what led to reforms 
of the system in, for example, France and 
the United Kingdom.
The second type of in-work benefits, 
the reduction in personal income tax and/
or employee social security contributions, 
aims to increase the net earnings of low-
wage workers so as to keep them in em-
ployment. In both Belgium and Germany, 
this policy has been introduced as a part of 
a more comprehensive tax reform aimed at 
decreasing the negative effects of a high tax 
burden on employment (see OECD, 2003). 
INSTITUTIONAL 
BACKGROUND IN SLOVENIA: 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, 
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE AND 
FAMILY BENEFITS 
In line with other EU countries, Slovenia 
provides a comprehensive social protection 
system. For unemployed workers, there is 
an unemployment insurance program offer-
ing financial support, as well as a range of 
active labor market programs. In addition, 
the registered unemployed are also provid-
ed coverage under the mandatory health 
insurance. Moreover, social assistance, a 
means-tested financial assistance, is also 
available to individuals and families with 
insufficient means for living. Families with 
children and low incomes are also eligible 
for child allowance.8 
Unemployment insurance works as fol-
lows. Unemployed workers can claim un-
employment benefits after termination of 
fixed-term employment or after involuntary 
termination of employment under the perma-
nent contract. To qualify for unemployment 
benefits, workers must have been employed 
for at least nine months in the preceding 24 
months (for young workers under the age of 
6 Child-related eligibility conditions are observed especially in countries where in-work benefits have a 
strong redistributive role (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009).
7 For example, in the United Kingdom there is no phase-in, whereas phase-out is set at 41 percent of average 
wage (see OECD, 2005, 2018a). In contrast, in the United States the phase out rates for lone parents with two 
children is about 20 percent and for single workers about 8 percent of average wage (Edwards and de Rugy, 2015).
8 There are also other social assistance programs in Slovenia, however, we do not include them in this paper, 
as they do not directly relate to the making-work-pay policies.
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30, six months in the preceding 24 months). 
The potential benefit duration is determined 
by the cumulative duration of employment 
engagements preceding the onset of unem-
ployment and the age of unemployed per-
son. The benefits range from two months for 
young workers with six to eight months of pri-
or employment to a maximum of 25 months 
for workers aged 55 or more (see Table 1). In 
addition, the Employment Service of Slove-
nia (ESS, 2018) pays pension and invalidity 
insurance contributions for a maximum of 
one year for the unemployed close to retire-
ment (i.e., 57 years of age or having 35 years 
of paid contributions). Entering retirement via 
unemployment insurance system is therefore 
quite common in Slovenia, as about 30 per-
cent of all old-age pension recipients entered 
retirement in this way (OECD, 2016).9 
 
Table 1
Potential duration of unemployment benefits in 
Slovenia, 2019





6 – 8 months (age below 30) 2
9 months – 5 years 3
5 – 15 years 6
15 – 25 years 9
over 25 years 12
over 25 years and aged 50–
54 years
19
over 25 years and aged 55+ 
years
25
Source: Labour Market Regulation Act, 2013. 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 
80/10, 21/13, 63/13, 100/13.
The level of unemployment benefit, de-
termined by a statutory replacement rate, is 
diminishing in time. The level of monthly 
benefits is calculated based on the average 
monthly wage received during the last eight 
months (or five months for young workers) 
prior to the onset of unemployment. The 
amount of a monthly benefit is determined 
as a share of so-determined average wage, 
that is, by the replacement rate. This rate is 
set at 80 percent for the first three months 
of the unemployment spell, and it is reduced 
to 60 percent between the fourth and the 
twelfth month of unemployment, and to 50 
percent thereafter. The benefit paid is sub-
ject to an absolute minimum of 350 EUR 
gross and maximum of 892.50 EUR gross 
(Labour Market Regulation Act, 2013).
Those who do not qualify for unem-
ployment benefits may be eligible for so-
cial assistance. Financial social assistance 
in Slovenia is a means-tested cash transfer 
provided to individuals with no income 
or income below the statutory set basic 
minimum income (i.e., 392.75 EUR since 
January 1, 2019).10 The eligibility criteria 
include possessing assets that enable sub-
sistence, taking advantage of other cash 
transfer schemes, and engaging in finding 
solutions to become financially independent 
(for example, actively seeking employment 
if unemployed). In case of no income, in-
dividuals without children receive the full 
basic minimum income; otherwise, they are 
entitled to the difference between their own 
income and the basic minimum income. 
The amount of cash financial assistance 
to a family is determined as the difference 
9 Compared to the OECD countries, Slovenia stands out with the long potential benefit duration for older 
workers. In about half of the European OECD countries, potential benefit duration is limited to one year (or 
less), regardless the age of the unemployed (see OECD (2016) for details).
10 In June 1, 2018, the statutory set basic minimum income increased for 29 percent (from 297.53 EUR to 
385.05 EUR) on the proposal of a political party The Left (sl. Levica). Due to the adjustment with inflation, the 
basic minimum income amounts 392.75 EUR since August 1, 2018. Although it was intended that the statutory 
minimum income will be decreased in January 2019 to 331.26 EUR, the new Government kept the minimum 
income at the same level. 
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between the sum of minimum incomes to 
which individual family members are enti-
tled, and the incomes of all family members 
(Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities of the Republic of 
Slovenia, 2019).
Financial social assistance is time limit-
ed and subject to renewal, but in some cases 
may also be permanent. Initially, financial 
social assistance is granted for a period of 
three months, and it can be extended to a 
maximum period of six months or one year 
if the improvement in the social position 
cannot be expected (due to age, illness or 
disability). In case of permanent incapabil-
ity for work or old-age (above 63 years for 
women and 65 years for men), individuals 
can be granted permanent financial social 
assistance (if they are not eligible for dis-
ability pensions). Individuals receiving fi-
nancial social assistance may also qualify 
for exceptional financial social assistance, 
which is granted in exceptional circum-
stances to cover extraordinary or urgent 
expenses or in cases when individual is 
found in financial distress for reasons be-
yond his/her control. It is paid as a lump 
sum or for a duration of three to six months, 
in the monthly amount up to 392.75 EUR 
for an individual and up to 1,080.06 EUR 
for a family with two children. Individuals 
can also apply for supplementary allow-
ance in case of permanent incapacity and 
for coverage of the additional cost of care. 
Families with children are also eligible to 
means-tested child allowance (Ministry of 
Labour, Family, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities of the Republic of Slovenia, 
2019).
Recipients of financial social assistance 
are also eligible for an activity allowance, 
aimed to encourage employment or motiva-
tion for work. To be eligible, an individual 
must be employed or engaged in volunteer 
work. The level of monthly activity al-
lowance depends on the number of hours 
worked and it ranges from 102.12 EUR 
for individuals working 60 to 128 hours 
per month to 200.3 EUR for individuals 
working more than 128 hours per month 
(Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities of the Republic of 
Slovenia, 2019). 
Families with low-incomes and children 
are eligible for child allowance, which is a 
supplementary monthly benefit for mainte-
nance, care and education of children. The 
level of child allowance is determined with 
regard to the classification of the family into 
individual income classes. Families with 
four or more children are also eligible for a 
large family allowance supplement, which 
takes the form of a yearly one-off benefit 
(Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities of the Republic of 
Slovenia, 2019).
DOES IT PAY TO 
WORK? SLOVENIA IN 
AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE
Below we analyze work incentive indi-
cators for Slovenia and compare them to 
the EU countries.
Methodology and Data
When taking up a job or increasing 
working hours, a significant part of new 
earnings can be taxed away through higher 
income taxes or reduced benefits. For some 
individuals or families this can result in lit-
tle or no gain from being employed in a low-
paid job or working more hours (OECD, 
2018b). To estimate the effect of tax and 
benefits system on the incentives to work, 
we examine several commonly-used mea-
sures. The most important is the marginal 
effective tax rate (METR), which mea-
sures what part of any additional earnings 
is taxed away through the combined effect 
of increasing taxes and decreasing benefits 
(OECD, 2018c). It is computed as:
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where ∆ygross are the additional earnings 
and ∆ynet is the change in net income ob-
tained after taxes and benefits. The change 
in gross earnings between labor market 
states A and B is: 
∆ygross = ygrossB – ygrossA
and the change in net income is: 
∆ynet = ynetB – ynetA = (ygrossB – tB + bB) – 
(ygrossA – tA + bA)
where t denotes total taxes and b denotes 
total benefits (OECD, 2018c).
The METR for a transition into work 
from non-employment is called the par-
ticipation tax rate (PTR). Its definition is 
equivalent to METR with labor market 
state B being “in work” (IW) and labor 
market state A being “out of work” (OW) 
(OECD, 2018c):
We will use the following work incen-
tives measures (Carone et al., 2004; Euro-
pean Commission, 2015; OECD, 2018c):
• PTR for recipients of unemployment 
benefits (i.e., unemployment trap) as an 
indicator for transitions from unemploy-
ment to employment – it measures the 
part of the additional gross wage that is 
taxed away in the form of increased tax-
es and withdrawn benefits such as unem-
ployment benefits, social assistance, and 
housing benefits when a person returns 
to work from unemployment.11 
• PTR for recipients of safety-net benefits 
(i.e., inactivity trap) as an indicator for 
a transition into work from inactivity 
without unemployment benefits – it mea-
sures the part of additional gross wage 
that is taxed away in the case where an 
inactive person (not entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits but eligible for 
income-tested social assistance) takes 
up a job.
• METR for part-time workers (i.e., low-
wage or poverty trap) as an indicator of 
increasing working hours or work effort 
– it is defined as the rate at which taxes 
are increased and benefits withdrawn as 
earnings rise. This trap is most likely to 
occur at relatively low wage levels due 
to the fact that the withdrawal of social 
transfers, which are usually available 
only to persons with a low income, adds 
to the marginal rate of income taxes and 
social security contributions.
The data for the analysis were obtained 
from the European Commission’s database 
Tax and benefits database (2018), OECD 
statistical database (OECD.Stat, 2018) 
and the OECD Tax and Benefits database 
(OECD, 2018d).
Unemployment Trap
The financial incentives to move to em-
ployment from unemployment while receiv-
11 PTR for unemployment benefits is closely related to the commonly-used measure net replacement rate 
(NRR) measure (defined as a ratio of net income while out of work divided by net income while in work), yet 
the relationship is not straightforward. The difference between the two measures is in the effect of earnings re-
ceived by other household members. Namely, the NRR takes into the account also incomes of other household 
members (they are included both in a numerator and denominator). This implies that, particularly in the case of 
two-earner families, the NRR can be driven by the spouse’s earnings. In contrast, the PTR relates the change 
in net household income to the change in gross earnings and is therefore not directly affected by the level of 
earnings received by other household members. The PTR is therefore considered a better indicator of financial 
work incentives. For a single or a single earner household with no other income than earnings a high NRR im-
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ing unemployment benefits are relatively 
weak for low-wage earners in Slovenia. As 
shown in Figure 1, tax rate at the wage of 
67 percent of average wage in most cases 
exceeds 85 percent. This implies that taking 
a full-time job at the 67 percent of average 
wage would result in 85 percent or more 
of the additional earnings being lost due 
to taxes and reduced benefits. Similarly, 
high unemployment traps are experienced 
by single persons and two-earner married 
couples with two children earning mini-
mum wage.12 PTRs tend to lower with the 
increase of wage at employment .








33 50 67 100 150
PT
R
% of average wage
 Single person  Single person with 2 children
 One-earner married couple without children  One-earner married couple with 2 children
 Two-earner married couple without children  Two-earner married couple with 2 children
Figure 1 
PTR for transition into full-time employment for persons receiving unemployment benefits at the initial level 
(during the first three months of the receipt), Slovenia, 2016, in percent
Notes: The PTR estimates relate to individuals who have just become unemployed and receive unemployment 
benefits. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:
• Social assistance or cash housing assistance are assumed to be available in either in-work or out of 
work. Any benefits payable on moving into employment are assumed to be paid. 
• The percentage of average wage relates to wage in full-time employment of the individual when moving 
into work. For married couples, the percentage of average wage relates to one spouse only; the second 
spouse is assumed to be inactive with no earnings in one-earner couples and to have full-time earnings 
equals to 67 percent of average wage in two-earner couples. 
• Estimates for families with children assume two children aged 4 and 6 and with family benefits.
Sources: European Commission, 2018; OECD, 2018d; own calculations.
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Slovenia faces a relatively strong unem-
ployment trap compared to the EU coun-
tries. As shown in Figure 2, Slovenia ranks 
5th among the EU countries by the PTR for 
unemployed single person with no children 
when employing at the 67 percent of the 
average wage – by employing at this wage, 
this single person lost 87.1 percent of the ad-
ditional earnings due to taxes and reduced 
benefits in 2016 (the EU average was 75.8 
percent). The unemployment traps for single 
person were higher only in Belgium, Den-
mark, Luxembourg and Latvia. In contrast, 
the most favorable results were observed in 
Romania and Slovakia, where PTR was be-
low 50 percent. Slovenia is also at the very top 
among the EU countries  with regard to un-
employment traps for other family types (see 
Figure 2) – it ranks 1st among the EU coun-
tries with regard to the PTR for two-earner 
couples with or without children (i.e., 90 and 
89.7 percent in 2016, respectively) and 4th 
with regard to the PTR for one-earner cou-
ples without children (87.9 percent). Overall, 
the EU countries record 8 to 18 percentage 
points lower average value of the PTR across 
different family types at the 67 percent of the 
average wage than Slovenia.13 Transitions 
from unemployment to employment are most 
favorable in Slovakia and Romania, especial-
ly for lone parents and one-earner couples. 
For two-earner couples, the lowest PTR is 
observed in the United Kingdom and Malta 
(see European Commission, 2018). All these 
countries, with the exception of Malta, pro-
vide in- or into-work benefi ts.
13  Differences between the EU average and Slovenia are smaller at higher wages. For example, the EU aver-
age PTR was about 8–13 percentage points lower at the average wage and 2–7 percentage points lower at the 150 
percent of the average wage in 2016 than in Slovenia across different family types (European Commission, 2018).
Figure 2
PTR for transition into full-time employment at 67 percent of average wage for persons receiving unemployment 
benefits at the initial level (during the first three months of the receipt), the EU countries, 2016, in percent
Notes:
• Countries are ranked by decreasing value of the PTR for single person with no children. 
• Data for Cyprus are not available.
• For definition of the PTR see Figure 1.
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The majority of the PTR for unemploy-
ment in Slovenia is attributable to the with-
drawal of unemployment benefits. As can 
be seen in Figure 3(a), the PTR for a single 
person moving to employment at 67 percent 
of average wage results in 87.1 percent of 
increased earnings being lost – out of this 
reduction, 80 percentage points is due to 
withdrawal of unemployment benefits. The 
same is true for other family types. The 
PTR is lower for individuals and families 
taking a job at the average wage (implying 
that the loss of additional earnings when 
employed is lower), yet unemployment 
benefits present 59 percentage points of the 
total PTR, followed by the expenses for the 
social security (9 percentage points of the 
total PTR) (see Figure 3( b)).14
Unemployment benefits also present an 
important constituent of unemployment trap 
in other EU countries, followed by the in-
come tax and social security contributions. 
In the United Kingdom, Ireland, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Malta and Finland, 
a part of the additional income when tak-
ing a job is lost also due to withdrawal of 
housing benefits. In contrast, one-earner 
married couples in Denmark, Sweden and 
Slovenia, who transit to employment at 67 
percent of average wage, still receive so-
cial assistance. Alternatively, some of the 
EU countries have introduced into-work 
or in-work benefits, which reduce the PTR 
and therefore increase the attractiveness of 
taking a job. For example, Slovakia records 
especially high into-work benefits, as they 
reduce PTR for 25 percentage points for sin-
gle and one-earner couples with no children 
and two-earner couples, and for 32 percent-
age points for lone parents and one-earner 
families with two children15. In Romania, 
into-work benefits decrease the PTR for 
8.6 percentage points (reduction is high-
er for two-earner couples, amounting 14.7 
percentage points). Something similar can 
be observed for in-work benefits schemes: 
in Sweden, these policies reduce the PTR 
for 7.7 percentage points and in Finland for 
6.4 percentage points.16 As regards Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands, the in-work 
benefits reduce the PTR for 3.1 to 10.6 per-
centage points, depending on the type of a 
family (see European Commission, 2018).
Transition from unemployment to em-
ployment is even less financially attractive 
when the new job pays lower wage than 
the one earned before unemployment. As 
shown in Figure 4, if prior to unemployment 
a person receives 67 percent of the average 
wage and after the employment accepts a 
job with a lower wage (for example, at 50 
percent of the average wage, which  in Slo-
venia is equivalent to the minimum wage), 
a single person lost 96 percent of the in-
creased earnings due to taxes and reduced 
unemployment benefits in 2016 (for com-
parison, the EU average amounted 86.8 per-
cent).17 One- and two-earner couples with 
no children have lost even more than 100 
percent of increased earnings. The reason 
for this lies in the fact that unemployment 
benefits are set as a percent of wage earned 
14 Employers in Slovenia are required to pay their workers travel allowance and meal allowance, which are 
not subject to taxation. Because unemployment benefit recipients do not receive these allowances, including 
this additional income, it reduces the unemployment trap in Slovenia by approximately ten percentage points 
(OECD, 2016). 
15 Data for transition to employment at 67 percent of average wage in 2016 (valid also for other countries).
16 In both Sweden and Finland, reduction is the same across all family types.
17 Similar estimates are observed if a person, earning average wage prior unemployment, re-employs at 
minimum wage or at 67 percent of average wage. If re-employing at the minimum wage in 2016, the PTR for 
single person was 102 percent, for lone parents with two children 87 percent, for one-earner family with no 
children 109 percent and with children 85 percent and for two-earner families with no children 111 percent and 
with children 99 percent (European Commission, 2018).
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Figure 3
Decomposition of the PTR for transition from unemployment to full-time employment at 67 percent of 
average wage (a) and at 100 percent of average wage (b), Slovenia, 2016, in percent
Note: For definition of the PTR see Figure 1.
Sources: European Commission, 2018; OECD, 2018d; own calculations.
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in the last employment (see Section 3). If 
moving to a higher paid job, the PTR rates 
are lower, although still high if compared 
to the EU countries – for example, if mov-
ing to employment at the average wage, a 
single person in Slovenia lost 74.2 percent 
of additional earnings in 2016, whereas the 
EU average was 62.4 percent (among the 
EU countries, PTR of single person was 























to 50% to 67% to 100%
Figure 4
PTR when moving from unemployment to work at wage levels 50, 67 and 100 percent of average wage, with 
previous earnings of 67 percent of average earnings, Slovenia, 2016
Note: For definition of the PTR see Figure 1.
Sources: European Commission, 2018; OECD, 2018d; own calculations.
Inactivity Trap
Slovenia also faces strong inactivity 
traps, particularly for low-wage earners.18 
For example, for  lone parents and one-earner 
married couples (with or without children), 
80 percent of increased earnings were lost 
when moving from inactivity to employment 
at the minimum wage in 2016 due to taxes 
and reduced financial social assistance. For 
18 In this section we present the last available data for 2016. In 2018 the social assistance remarkably in-
creased (see Section 3), implying that the inactivity traps are even higher.
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Figure 5
PTR for transition into full-time employment for persons without entitlement to unemployment insurance 
but entitled to social assistance, Slovenia, 2016, in percent
Notes:
The PTR relates to the situation of a person who is not entitled to unemployment benefit, but instead, he/
she receives social assistance and other means-tested benefits. Estimates are based on the following 
assumptions:
• The percentage of average wage relates to wage in full-time employment of the individual when moving 
into work. For married couples, the percentage of average wage relates to one spouse only; the second 
spouse is assumed to be inactive with no earnings in a one-earner married couple and to have full-time 
earnings equal to 67 percent of average wage in a two-earner couple. 
• Estimates for families with children assume two children aged 4 and 6 and family benefits.
Sources: European Commission, 2018; OECD, 2018d; own calculations.
lone parents and one-earner families the 
PTR was even higher, reaching 85 percent 
when moving to employment at the 67 per-
cent of average wage. At taking a job at the 
average wage, the PTR declined, however 
it still remained significant, as it ranged be-
tween 42 and 77 percent (see Figure 5) . 
Among the EU countries, Slovenia 
ranks in the upper half based on its inac-
tivity trap (see Figure 6).19 Differences in 
the PTR when moving from inactivity to 
employment between the EU average and 
Slovenia are especially high for lone par-
ents with two children (up to 32 percentage 
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 Single person  Single person with 2 children
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 Two-earner married couple without children  Two-earner married couple with 2 children
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points in case of employment at 67 per-
cent of the average wage in 2016) and for 
one-earner married couples with children 
(11 and 19 percentage points in case of em-
ployment at minimum or at 67 percent of 
average wage, respectively). As shown in 
Figure 6, when moving from inactivity to 
employment, workers lose the least in Slo-
vakia – in 2016, the PTR amounted to 18.5 
percent for a single person and 29.5 percent 
for one-earner families; for lone parents the 
PTR is even negati ve .
In Slovenia, as in the majority of the EU 
countries, the major component of the inac-
tivity trap is the loss of financial social as-
sistance. In the case of a one-earner family 
Figure 6
PTR for transition into full-time employment at 67 percent of average wage for persons without entitlement to 
unemployment insurance but entitled to social assistance, the OECD and the EU countries, 2016, in percent
Notes:
• Countries are ranked by decreasing value of the PTR for single person with no children. 
• Data for Cyprus are not available.
• For definition of the PTR see Figure 5.
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with two children, 85 percent of increased 
earnings were lost in 2016 when moving to 
employment at 67 percent of average wage 
– out of this reduction, 59 percentage points 
was due to the loss of financial social assis-
tance, followed by 22 percentage points due 
to payment of social security contributions 
(see Figure 7(a)). Financial social assistance 
is an important constituent of the inactivi-
ty trap also for one-earner couples with no 
children and lone parents (see Figure 7(a)). 
When moving to employment that pays a 
larger wage, the inactivity trap lowers (see 
Figure 7(b)) for the case of moving to em-
ployment at average  wage).
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Figure 7
Decomposition of the PTR for transition from inactivity to full-time employment at 67 percent of average 
wage (a) and at 100 percent of average wage (b), Slovenia, 2016, in percent
Note: For definition of the PTR see Figure 5.
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The EU countries with the highest in-
activity traps are the Scandinavian and 
Western European countries, while the 
lowest ones are Romania, Greece, Italy and 
Slovakia – as already shown in Figure 6, in 
all these countries PTRs were below 40 per-
cent for all family types in 2016. Some EU 
countries reduce their rather high inactivity 
traps by introducing in-work or into-work 
benefits – in Ireland, in-work benefits re-
duced the inactivity trap for one-earner 
families and lone parents with two children 
by 23 percentage points in 2016. In Slova-
kia, which has temporary into-work benefit 
and records the lowest inactivity traps, this 
reduction was even higher, ranging from 
20.7 percentage points for single persons 
and one-earner couples without children 
to 41.4 percentage points for two-earner 
couples (European Commission, 2018).20
Low-wage or Poverty Trap
The low-wage trap in Slovenia is espe-
cially high for families with children. The 
low-wage trap or METR measures the ex-
tent to which taxes and benefits reduce the 
financial gain of increasing work hours. 
As shown in Figure 8, in 2016 the tax bur-
den, when increasing working hours (for 
example, from 33 to 67 percent of a full 
time job) for a one-earner married couple 
with two children was 80 percent, while it 
was 72 percent for a lone parent with two 
children. Compared to the EU average, the 
METR in Slovenia is up to 26 percentage 
points higher for lone parents, whereas for 
one-earner families 23 percentage points 
(European Commission, 2018). Moreover, 
Slovenia ranks second among the EU coun-
tries by METR for married couples with 
two children and working spouse earning 
67 percent of average wage – in 2016, the 
METR for moving from 67 percent to full-
time job amounted to 59 percent, implying 
that this percentage of increased earnings 
was lost due to higher taxes and social 
security contributions and reduced social 
transfers. By contrast, the comparable EU 
average in 2016 was 40 percent (see Europe-
an Commission, 2018). A closer analysis of 
EU countries shows that the lowest METR 
was recorded for families in Bulgaria, Es-
tonia, Lithuania and Croatia.
The tax burden of moving to a higher 
paid job reflects the higher income taxes 
and social contributions in the higher paid 
job, and in some family types also loss of 
social assistance. As shown in Figure 9, 
almost the entire low wage trap for indi-
viduals and families with children when 
moving from 33 to 67 percent of a full time 
job is attributable to the increased tax bur-
den (higher income tax and social security 
contributions). An exception to this rule are 
lone parents and one-earner couples with 
two children, where more than half of the 
loss of additional earnings when moving to 
higher paid job is attributable to the loss of 
social transfer s. 
20 The inactivity traps in Slovenia are probably lower, as they do not include travel and meal allowance and 
reduction of childcare benefits due to transition in employment (OECD, 2016).
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Figure 8 
METR for part-time employees at different working-hours transitions, Slovenia, 2016, in percent
Notes:
• Hourly earnings correspond to the average wage level throughout so that a 1/3-time employee would 
have earnings equal to 33 percent of average wage. 
• Means-tested benefits, including cash housing assistance, are assumed to be available subject to the 
relevant income conditions. 
• Children are aged 4 and 6; family benefits are included 
• For married couples the percentage of average wage relates to one spouse only; the second spouse is 
assumed be “inactive” with no earnings in a one-earner married couple and to have full-time earnings 
equal to 67 percent of average wage in a two-earner couple. In the case of the one-earner married 
couple, where receipt of social assistance or other minimum-income benefits is subject to activity tests 
(such as active job-search or being “available” for work), these requirements are assumed to be met by 
the second spouse.















 Single person  Single person with 2 children
 One-earner married couple without children  One-earner married couple with 2 children
 Two-earner married couple without children  Two-earner married couple with 2 children
332
Rev. soc. polit., god. 26, br. 3, str. 315-337, Zagreb 2019. Laporšek S., Vodopivec M., Vodopivec M.: Making Work Pay...
Figure 9 
Decomposition of the METR for moving to higher paid job (from 33 to 67 percent of average wage), Slovenia, 
2016, in percent
Note: Definition of the METR is available at Figure 8.
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In the EU perspective, Slovenia also 
has relatively high low-wage traps for indi-
viduals and families without children. The 
METR for transition from 33 to 67 percent 
of a full-time job or from 2/3 to a full-time 
job for single persons and two-earner cou-
ples in Slovenia is above the EU average. 
For example, for single person who moves 
from 2/3 to a full-time job the METR 
amounted 42.8 percent in 2016, whereas the 
EU average was 39.3 percent; the difference 
is higher in case of one-earner couples – the 
METR in Slovenia amounted 58.3 percent 
in 2016, the EU average was 39.1 percent. 
Overall, low-wage traps for individuals and 
families with no children are the highest in 
Scandinavian and Western European coun-
tries. In contrast, the low-wage trap is rather 
low in Slovakia, Bulgaria and some Baltic 
countries (European Commission, 2018).
CONCLUSIONS AND 
DISCUSSION
Making-work-pay policies allow for 
pursuing income redistribution and pov-
erty reduction goals while simultaneously 
improving work incentives and promoting 
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transitions to employment, which is clearly 
a social welfare maximizing strategy. This 
is one of the reasons why a growing number 
of OECD countries has already introduced 
one of the two forms of making-work-pay 
policies: into-work benefits and in-work 
benefits.
From our analysis above it is clear that 
in Slovenia families and individuals who 
are not working have poor incentives to find 
a job – because for many, “it does not pay 
to work.” In other words, unemployment 
benefits and cash transfers, coupled with 
high tax wedge, may have a strong effect 
on work disincentives in Slovenia. Our main 
findings are:
• Financial incentives to move from un-
employment to employment in Slovenia 
are among the weakest in the EU, re-
gardless the family type or wage level.
• Transition from unemployment to em-
ployment is financially particularly un-
attractive when the new job pays a lower 
wage than earned before unemployment 
– in such cases, the transition to work 
may even reduce the net income.
• Slovenia records high inactivity traps, 
particularly for low-earning lone par-
ents and one-earner married couples 
with children, placing it in the upper half 
among the EU countries ranked by the 
level of disincentives. 
• Poverty traps in Slovenia are close to the 
EU average, but for two-earners married 
couples with children, Slovenia is at the 
very top. 
However, work disincentives are not in-
fluenced only by financial factors, but there 
are also other important factors which influ-
ence labor market participation and which 
were not studied in this paper. For exam-
ple, better working conditions, possibility 
for promotion, development and training, 
and stimulating work environment, i.e., fac-
tors that should be addressed by employers 
are providing decent payment. Important 
non-financial factors also include the avail-
ability of childcare and balance between 
work and family life (EMCO, 2003).
Given the above evidence, Slovenia 
should consider introducing into-work ben-
efits, in-work benefits, or both. While pres-
ently such policies are virtually non-exis-
tent, they undoubtedly provide a much more 
attractive and ultimately viable option in 
comparison to cutting welfare benefit levels 
– an alternative strategy to enhance current-
ly weak financial incentives to work.21 In the 
light of international experience with such 
policies and given the strong work disincen-
tive created by unemployment, inactivity, 
and low-pay traps, in Slovenia such policies 
have a great potential to stimulate transi-
tions from non-employment to employment. 
They would particularly help vulnerable 
groups, such as long-term benefit recipi-
ents and low-paid workers, but also older 
workers and young mothers. By increasing 
employment participation, such policies are 
also likely to contribute to a more equal 
income distribution, as well as to a reduc-
tion of in-work poverty. Such developments 
were, for example, observed both in France 
and in the United Kingdom, where in-work 
benefits increased the household incomes 
and reduced poverty rates (see, for exam-
ple, Canova, Piccoli and Spadaro (2015) 
for France, and OECD (2014) and Browne, 
Hood and Joyce (2016) for the United King-
dom). The German Hartz reform was also 
effective in increasing employment and 
helping the long-term unemployed in find-
ing more stable post-unemployment jobs, 
21 The only exception is rather low activity allowance (with a maximum of 200.12 EUR) paid to the recip-
ients of financial social assistance when taking a part-time job or voluntary work, however it presents a weak 
incentive to progress to full-time employment.
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but by generating mostly low paid employ-
ment, its effect on poverty was limited (see, 
for example, Galassi (2016)).
In designing into-work benefits, Slo-
venia may be following the examples of 
Austria, Romania or Slovakia. In these 
countries, into-work benefits are targeted 
to persons taking employment on a full-
time basis.22 Particular attention should be 
given to reducing deadweight losses, that 
is, to minimizing the likelihood that ben-
eficiaries would have found a job even in 
the absence of the benefit scheme (OECD, 
2018d).23 This can be achieved by narrow-
ing the entitlement to vulnerable groups, 
such as the long-term unemployed, unem-
ployed with low-earnings capacity, and old-
er unemployed. One modality of into-work 
benefits is to pay out unemployment bene-
fits, at a reduced rate, for the remainder of 
potential duration, as an into-work benefit 
(as practiced in Japan and Korea, for ex-
ample). By doing so, Slovenia would also 
reduce the moral hazard problem plaguing 
the behaviour of unemployment benefit re-
cipients – the fact that the receipt of unem-
ployment benefits reduces the likelihood of 
exiting unemployment (see Vodopivec et al., 
2015). Another good side of into-work ben-
efits is relatively low budgetary costs. On 
the other hand, the drawback of into-work 
benefits, as mentioned above, is the fact that 
their employment effects decline or fade 
near the point of the exhaustion of bene-
fits, as well as that (because they are most-
ly linked to individuals) they have limited 
effects on families with dependent children. 
Furthermore, as they are time-limited, there 
is a risk that workers do not progress to the 
stage of earning a self-sufficient wage. Their 
income redistribution and poverty reduction 
impact is limited, too.
Another approach to stimulate work 
incentives – addressing some of the short-
comings of into-work benefits – is via in-
work benefits. Above all, in-work benefits 
are provided on a permanent basis and, as 
such, are a more effective tool in stimulat-
ing work incentives. In-work benefits can be 
either individual or family-based. Although 
family based in-work incentives can result 
in higher redistribution effects, they can 
also create work disincentives, especially 
for second-earners. Possible drawbacks of 
in-work benefits are that they may create 
low-wage traps and fail to encourage work-
ers to develop their skills.24 Nevertheless, 
in-work benefits schemes are rather expen-
sive – with costs reported up to 2 percent 
of the GDP (OECD, 2014) – and adminis-
tratively demanding.25 Therefore, a special 
attention should be given to the reduction 
of deadweight losses. This can be achieved 
by well-designed targeting and phasing-out 
rates – set at low levels if the main objective 
is to incentivize workers to employ or at 
higher levels if the main concern is keeping 
workers in jobs.26
22 Applying the full-time employment condition may limit the job possibilities for persons welfare, who can 
only take part-time jobs (OECD, 2005).
23 Part of this cost is outweighed through the increased employment.
24 As benefits are paid out as long as wages are below set threshold, workers would not raise their working 
hours or work effort or increase their skill in order to still qualify for the benefit – this is especially the case if 
benefits are generous or difficult to access (see Section 3; OECD, 2003).
25 Immervoll (2016) points on the trade-off between the cost of in-work benefits and their effects – either 
in-work benefits are costly or damage work incentives.
26  Targeting can help reduce costs in two ways: (i) directly, by reducing the number of indented beneficia-
ries; and (ii) reducing the number of windfall beneficiaries (OECD 2005). Yet, it should be kept in mind that if 
targeting is to narrow it can have limited effects, affect behavior of welfare recipients and raise questions about 
equity (OECD, 2003, 2005). 
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Of course, the complexity of the design 
of making-work-pay policies – and the 
demands they pose on their administra-
tion – should not be underestimated. How 
hard getting the design right can be maybe 
gauged from the case of the United King-
dom: even in a country that has substantial 
experience with such policies, the overhaul 
of its making-work-pay policies has under-
gone significant changes and it will take 
more than a decade to be achieved. The 
complexity arises because it is necessary 
to view these policies not in isolation, but 
rather as a component of a comprehensive 
strategy to help the transition from welfare 
to work (OECD, 2005; Immervoll and Pear-
son, 2009). Other elements that should be 
considered are family allowances, childcare 
subsidies, particularly for single parents, 
and other fringe benefits (above all in Slo-
venia, reimbursement of travel costs and 
meals).27 Another important element to be 
considered is the existence of minimum 
wage – appropriately set minimum wage 
is one way to ensure that workers, and not 
their employers, benefit from in-work ben-
efits. Moreover, as the case of Germany 
shows, effective changes in activation pol-
icies are also an important ingredient of 
welfare to work reforms.
Designing a system where strong work 
incentives are compatible with a country’s 
social policy goals can be difficult. It in-
volves balancing the desire to protect the 
most vulnerable members of society – for 
example, families with children – while 
maintaining incentives for individuals to 
engage in productive work. Countries with 
strong social policies, such as Slovenia, 
are arguably quite successful in achieving 
the former. To be successful at the latter, 
into- or in-work benefits arguably have an 
important role – and it should be kept in 
mind that they create a large, meaningful 
impact only if they create a sizeable dif-
ference between welfare out-of-work and 
work income, if they are well targeted to a 
specific income groups or family types and 
are not excessively bureaucratic. 
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Sažetak
POLITIKA ISPLATIVOSTI RADA U SLOVENIJI
Suzana Laporšek, Milan Vodopivec, Matija Vodopivec
Fakulteta za management, Univerza na Primorskem
Koper, Slovenija
Članak analizira poticaje za prijelaz iz nezaposlenosti u zaposlenost izražene pomoću 
različitih financijskih pokazatelja u Sloveniji i uspoređuje ih s onima u državama EU. Čla-
nak daje pregled glavnih značajki politika isplativosti rada i raspravlja razloge za njihovu 
primjenu u Sloveniji. Pokazuje se da u Sloveniji obitelji i pojedinci koji ne rade imaju slabe 
poticaje za pronalaženje posla, jer za mnoge se „posao ne isplati“. Naknade za nezapos-
lene i novčane naknade, zajedno s visokim poreznim klinom, odvraćaju od rada. Kako bi 
se riješio ovaj problem, Slovenija bi trebala razmotriti uvođenje dodataka za zapošljavan-
je, naknada za zaposlene ili oboje. Trenutačno takve politike gotovo ne postoje. U svjetlu 
međunarodnih uspješnih iskustava s takvim politikama i s obzirom na visoki destimulira-
jući učinak koji stvaraju zamke nezaposlenosti, neaktivnosti i niskih plaća, takve politike 
u Sloveniji imaju veliki potencijal za poticanje prijelaza iz nezaposlenosti u zaposlenost i 
ostanak u radnom odnosu.
Ključne riječi: politika isplativosti rada, naknade za zaposlene, dodaci za zapošljavanje, 
zamla nezaposlenosti, zamka neaktivnosti, zamka niskih plaća, Slovenija.
